---
title: "[WEEK 9 TITLE]"
subtitle: "[WEEK 9 SUBTITLE]"
date: last-modified
date-format: "[Updated ]MMM D, YYYY"
format: 
  revealjs:
    theme: brownslides.scss
    logo: images/pols1140_hex.png
    footer: "[COURSE CODE]"
    multiplex: false
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    slide-number: c
    incremental: true
    center: false
    menu: true
    scrollable: true
    highlight-style: github
    progress: true
    code-overflow: wrap
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execute: 
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---


```{r}
#| label: init
#| echo: false
#| results: hide
#| warning: false 
#| message: false

library(tidyverse)
library(labelled)
library(haven)
library(DeclareDesign)
library(easystats)
library(texreg)

```


# {{< fa map-location >}} Overview {.inverse}

## Plan {.smaller}

Today:

- Broad overview of the field:

- Theories of Race and Ethnicity

- Racial and Ethnic Politics
  - Racial Gaps
  - Race and Group Interactions
  - Race and Representation
  - Race as Social Identity

 
 - Begin discussion of "Selling out" @White2014-km

Thursday

  - Finish @White2014-km

  - "Racial Spillover" @Tesler2012-hu
  
  - Possibly @Wong2005-ck and @Jardina2020-yd

## Class Structure: Assigned Readings Going Forward {.smaller}

:::{.nonincremental}

  **Race**
  
  - March 17: White, Laird, and Allen (2014) 
  - March 19: Tesler (2012)
  
  **Gender**
  
  - April 7: Huddy, L. and Terkildsen, N. (1993)
  - April 9: Egan (2012)
  
  **Socialization and Biology in Politics:**
  
  - April 14 Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers, J. (2009)
  - April 16: Alford, Funk, and Hibbing (2005).
  
  **Influence and Persuasion:**
  
  - April 21: Mutz (2002a)
  - April 23: Kalla and Broockman (2022).


:::

## Free Pizza Thursday

I generally take students out at the end of semester for food. 

Feel free to come by [Pizza Marvin](https://www.pizzamarvin.com/) at:

[468 Wickenden St, Providence, RI 02903](https://maps.app.goo.gl/MjFawbkodxbtVcth8)

At 5 pm on Thursday. I'll order a couple of pies to be ready when we get there, and will order more as needed. 

## Help me with my fit

![](https://i.giphy.com/media/v1.Y2lkPTc5MGI3NjExcGFlOXlqYmk2czZ1MWJteDFvYThjeDFsaG5tcHR1MjdkeWFrZ21sciZlcD12MV9pbnRlcm5hbF9naWZfYnlfaWQmY3Q9Zw/b8Wa0uAcDh5ew/giphy.gif)

## Our Fashion Advice

```{r}
#| echo: false

library(tidyverse)
library(kableExtra)
df <- haven::read_spss("surveys/wk09.sav")


df_poll <- df

df %>%
  filter(share == 1) -> df
df_poll %>% 
  mutate(across(starts_with("fit"), forcats::as_factor)) ->df_poll

df_poll %>% 
  select(starts_with("fit")) %>% 
  pivot_longer(cols = starts_with("fit")) %>% 
  group_by(name, value) %>% 
  summarise(
    n =n(),
  ) %>% 
  group_by(name) %>% 
  summarise(
    Choice = value[n==max(n)],
    Votes = max(n)
  ) %>% 
  mutate(
    Option = str_to_title(gsub("fit_","",name)),

  ) %>% select(
    Option, Choice, Votes
  ) -> fashion_tab

kable(fashion_tab)
```

## What would Derek Guy say?

Apparently nothing...

{{< tweet ProfPaulTesta 1860348618294603905 >}}


## AMA

```{r}
#| echo: false


DT::datatable(df %>% 
                select(ama),
               fillContainer = F,
              height = "90%",
              options = list(
                pageLength = 5
              )
              )
```


## Final Papers 

- "Five things you need to know about ... "

- Flexible format any topic from the course

    - Should discuss at least 3 articles.

- [Prompt](/assignments/t2)

  - [Example 1](/files/assignments/t2_ex1.pdf)
  - [Example 2](/files/assignments/t2_ex2.pdf)

## Final Paper Structure

1. Introduce the topic:
2. Lay out key theories and topics
3. Present a major debate that interests you
4. Discuss revisions or extensions to that debate
5. Offer a direction for future research

## Final Paper Structure

- What is partisanship?
- Why does partisanship matter?
- Partisanship is a social identity
- Partisanship is a heuristic for voters
- Partisanship bleeds into our personal lives 


# {{< fa lightbulb >}} Studying Race and Ethnicity {.inverse}


## Goals for today

- Why race is central to U.S. politics
- What it means to say race is a *social construct*
- How race operates through *social identity*
- Key concept: **linked fate and group consciousness**


## Why Study Race in Politics?

::::{.columns}
:::{.column width="50%"}

- Race is central to U.S. political history  
- Race continues to shape:
  - voting behavior  
  - policy attitudes  
  - political inequality  

- The U.S. is becoming increasingly multiracial  
$\to$ racial politics will remain (or become more) central

:::
:::{.column width="50%"}

![](https://i0.wp.com/www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/20180910_metro_Frey_census-datacharts-revised-Fig4.png?w=768&crop=0%2C0px%2C100%2C9999px&ssl=1)

:::
::::


## Race vs Ethnicity

- **Race**: socially constructed categories often *perceived* as biological  
- **Ethnicity**: shared culture, language, ancestry, or national origin  

- The distinction is blurry—but analytically useful. See [James (2016)](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/race/#RacVerEth)

## What is Race?

Two broad perspectives ([Sen and Wasow 2016](https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-032015-010015)):

- **Essentialist**
  - Race reflects biological differences
  - Fixed and immutable

- **Constructivist**
  - Race is shaped by social, political, and historical forces
  - Categories and meanings change over time

- Political (Social) science generally adopts a **constructivist view**


## Why Does This Matter?

- If race is **fixed**, how can it cause anything?

> “No causation without manipulation” (Holland 1986)

- We can’t randomly assign race $\to$ so what are we estimating when we say “the effect of race”?


### Constructivist solution:

- Race = **bundle of attributes**
  - names, neighborhoods, language, appearance, etc.

- These *can* vary and be studied causally

## Race as a Bundle of Sticks

Race is not one thing—it is a collection of attributes:

- Some are **fixed** (e.g., ancestry)
- Some are **mutable** (e.g., names, signals, context)

![](images/10_race/s1.png)


## Variations in Mutability

![](images/10_race/s2.png)


## Summary


- Race and ethnicity are socially constructed  

- Consist of multiple components with varying mutability  

- Treating race as a "bundle" helps us study how it shapes politics


## How Do We Study Race in Political Science?

Four approaches:

- **Group Differences**
  - Racial gaps in attitudes and outcomes

- **Group Interactions**
  - Contact vs. threat

- **Representation**
  - Do politicians reflect the groups they represent?

- **Social Identity**
  - Linked fate and group consciousness


# {{< fa lightbulb >}} Racial Gaps {.inverse}

## Racial Gaps

Political science documents large racial differences in:

- Partisanship  
- Participation  
- Political knowledge  
- Policy attitudes  

- Race is one of the strongest predictors of political behavior in the U.S.

## Racial Gaps in Partisanship:

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="60%"}
- Black Americans: overwhelmingly Democratic  
- White Americans: more evenly split (and increasingly Republican)
:::
::: {.column width="40%"}
![](https://www.people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2018/03/2_3.png)
:::

::::



## Racial Gaps in Partisanship

![](https://www.people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2018/03/2_4.png)

## Racial Gaps in Turnout

![](https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2025/06/PP-2025.6.26_validated-voters_1-07.png)

## Racial (Class?) Gaps in Participation

::::{.columns}

::: {.column width = "50%"}
- Participation depends on:
  - time  
  - money  
  - civic skills  
- Apparent “racial gaps” may reflect **resource inequalities**
:::


::: {.column width = "50%"}
![](images/10_race/v1.png)


[Schlozman, Verba, Brady (2012)](https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.revproxy.brown.edu/lib/brown/detail.action?docID=889039)

:::
::::

## Racial Gaps in Political Knowledge

:::: {.columns}

:::{.column width="50%"}
- Standard measures focus on:
  - institutions, elites, formal politics  

- But may miss:
  - lived experiences (e.g., policing, carceral state)

:::

:::{.column width="50%"}

![](images/10_race/c1.png)


[Cohen and Luttig (2019)](https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/B393C0399987F7CBB429B0D614DC5D1C/S1537592718003857a.pdf/reconceptualizing_political_knowledge_race_ethnicity_and_carceral_violence.pdf)

:::

::::

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Large differences in views on:

  - criminal justice  
  - punishment  
  - social policy  

- Race shapes how people interpret policy tradeoffs

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/b2.png)

:::
::::

## What Do These Gaps Mean?

- Race strongly predicts political behavior  

- But:

  - Gaps do **not** explain *why* race matters  
  - Some reflect **resources**, not just identity  
  - Some reflect **measurement choices**

- We need theory to explain these patterns

## From Patterns to Explanations

Two key questions:

- Why do racial groups think differently?  
- Why do they behave differently?  

We’ll explore two answers:

- **Psychology** (identity, perception)  
- **Social context** (norms, pressure)



# {{<fa lightbulb>}} Race and Group Interactions {.inverse}

## When Does Contact Reduce Conflict?

Two competing theories (Allport 1954, Pettigrew 1998, 2006):

- **Threat hypothesis**
  - $\uparrow$ contact $\to$ perceived competition $\to$ worse attitudes  

- **Contact hypothesis**
  - $\uparrow$ contact $\to$ familiarity $\to$ better attitudes  

- Which one is right?

## When Do We See Each?

Evidence depends on:

- **Context** (where contact occurs)  
- **Type of change** (gradual vs sudden)  
- **Selection** (who lives where)

- Two studies to illsutrate this:
  - [Hopkins (2010)](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/politicized-places-explaining-where-and-when-immigrants-provoke-local-opposition/2E1DEBDEA57191252E61B41084AFA348) 
  - [Oliver (2010)](https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7208/9780226626642/html)



- 

## Hopkins (2010): Politicized Places

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Studies reactions to immigration across communities  

- Key idea:
  - **Sudden local change + national rhetoric $\to$ threat**

- Not just diversity—but **unexpected change**

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/h1.png)

:::
::::

## When Does Immigration Trigger Threat?

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Threat increases when:

  - immigration rises **rapidly**  
  - issue is **politically salient**  

- People react to *change*, not just presence

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/h5.png)

:::
::::


## Oliver (2010): Neighborhood Context

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Studies how neighborhood diversity shapes attitudes  

- Key finding:
  - More integrated neighborhoods $\to$ less racial resentment  
- Supports **contact hypothesis**

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](https://tmm.chicagodistributioncenter.com/IsbnImages/9780226626635.jpg)

:::
::::

## Evidence Across Groups

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Across racial groups:

  - More integration $\to$ more positive attitudes  

- Pattern is consistent, not group-specific

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/o1.png)

:::
::::


## What Explains This?

- **Intergroup contact**
  - exposure reduces prejudice  

- **Self-selection**
  - tolerant people choose diverse areas  

- Hard to separate cause from selection

## Hopkins vs. Oliver: Are They in Conflict?

- **Hopkins (2010)**
  - sudden change $\to$ threat  
  - especially when politicized  

- **Oliver (2010)**
  - sustained exposure $\to$ tolerance  


- 👉 Key insight:

  - **Rapid, unexpected change $\to$ threat**  
  - **Stable, everyday contact $\to$ tolerance**


## What explains the difference?

- Unit of analysis (community vs neighborhood)  
- Time scale (short-term vs long-term)  
- Self-selection  

# {{<fa lightbulb>}} Race and Representation {.inverse}

## Why Representation Matters

- Do elected officials need to *look like* constituents?

- Does identity shape:
  - attitudes  
  - participation  
  - policy outcomes  

- 👉 Central question: **Does descriptive representation change politics?**

## Descriptive Representation

- Representatives share constituents’ social identities  

- One form of representation (Pitkin 1967):

  - Formalistic  
  - Substantive  
  - **Descriptive**  
  - Symbolic  

- 👉 Focus: when identity itself matters

## Does Descriptive Representation Matter?

- Citizen attitudes  
- Turnout  
- Legislative behavior  

- 👉 Evidence is mixed and context-dependent

## Descriptive Representation and Attitudes

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Black political empowerment → higher participation  

- Example:
  - Black mayor → increased engagement  

- 👉 Representation can signal inclusion and efficacy

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/b1.png)

:::
::::

## Descriptive Representation and Turnout

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Co-ethnic candidates alone do not increase turnout  

- Instead:
  - turnout $\to$ increases as group size (share of district) increases  

- 👉 Group context may matter more than candidate identity

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/cms/asset/6bfce341-9bbe-4edd-95e6-3a1545c6dff6/ajps12172-fig-0001-m.png)

:::
::::

## Descriptive Representation and Policy

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- White representatives:
  - less responsive to Black constituents  

- Minority representatives:
  - more responsive  

- 👉 Identity can shape representation in practice

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/cms/asset/0bd7beff-693c-44a1-b8b1-8ca1dd601b56/ajps_515_f1.gif)

:::
::::

## What Do We Learn?

- Descriptive representation can matter  

- But effects are:
  - conditional  
  - context-dependent  
  - not uniform  

- 👉 Identity alone does not determine outcomes  
- 👉 We need theory to explain when it matters









# {{<fa lightbulb>}} Race as a Social Identity {.inverse}

## Three Components of Identity

Race as a social identity includes:

- **Membership**  
- **Identification**  
- **Consciousness**

- 👉 Each varies across people and contexts

## Membership

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Assigned to a group based on shared characteristics  

- Defined socially—not biologically  

👉 Boundaries of groups change over time

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/l1.png)

:::
::::

## Identification

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Psychological attachment to a group  

- Varies in:
  - strength  
  - context  

- Can be activated by cues  

👉 Identity is not always salient

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/j1.png)

:::
::::

## Identification varies context and strength

![](images/10_race/j1.png)

[Junn and Masuoka 2008](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/asian-american-identity-shared-racial-status-and-political-context/BDC6709C346FF07C8C3C085F83E0AAF6) find respondents randomly assigned to view co-racial cabinet member had higher levels racial identification

## Group Consciousness

- Identity becomes political  

- Includes:
  - sense of shared fate  
  - beliefs about group status  
  - support for collective action  

- 👉 Bridge between identity and politics



## Group Consciousness

![](images/10_race/a1.png)


## Summary

- Race is socially constructed  

- Identity has three components:
  - membership  
  - identification  
  - consciousness  

- Each varies across:
  - individuals  
  - contexts  
  - time  

- 👉 Identity must be activated to matter politically



# {{<fa lightbulb>}} Linked Fate {.inverse}
    
## Group Consciousness

::::{.columns}
:::{.column width="50%"}

- Group Consciousness (GC) is link between identity and politics
- Much of early research on group consciousness focuses on Blacks' racial group consciousness
    - Tate (1993)
    - Dawson (1994)

:::
:::{.column width="50%"}

![](https://images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com/images/I/51BWfhSIfjL._SX331_BO1,204,203,200_.jpg)

:::
::::

## Puzzle:

Why have well-off Blacks seldom become more socially, economically, and politically conservative as they became upwardly mobile or as their children grew up in the middle class?


## Potential Answers:

- Black political homogeneity reflects a strong sense of **Linked Fate**

- Shared experiences of disadvantage and discrimination $\to$ a sense that:

- One's own well being depends on well being of Black Americans as whole (Linked Fate)

## Linked Fate as a Heuristic

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Dawson (1994):

  - Group interest $\to$ proxy for self-interest  

- Efficient when:
  - race structures life chances  

👉 Simplifies political decision-making

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](https://pup-assets.imgix.net/onix/images/9780691025438.jpg)

:::
::::

## Measuring Linked Fate

- Standard survey question:

- “Does what happens to Black people affect your life?”

- 👉 Captures perceived interdependence

## Linked Fate 

Dawson (1994) finds linked fate among Blacks: 



- Is generally high



- Doesn't vary by class and mitigate class-based policy differences



- Predicts vote choice (in 1984 and 1988 elections)

## Open Questions

- Is linked fate declining?  
- Is it unique to Black Americans?  
- Is it specific to race?  
- Is it inherently political?  

## Is Linked Fate Unique?

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Other groups also express linked fate  

- But:
  - varies in strength  
  - varies in political relevance  

👉 Not uniquely Black—but especially strong

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/ho1.png)

:::
::::


## Summary

- Linked fate connects identity to politics  

- Explains group cohesion  

- But:

  - not the full story  
  - varies across groups and contexts  

- 👉 Raises questions about limits of group-based explanations

## From Linked Fate to Group Conflict {.smaller}

- Dawson:  
  - Group interest $\to$ proxy for self-interest  

- But:
  - What if group interest conflicts with personal gain?  
  - Why don’t more people defect?  

- Examples:

  - “sellout” accusations  
  - politicians crossing group lines  

- 👉 This is the puzzle:

  - Why does group cohesion persist under conflict?

- White, Laird, and Allen (2014) answer this:
  - **social pressure and group norms**


# {{<fa lightbulb>}} Group Interest in Conflict (White et al. 2014) {.inverse}

## When Group and Self Interest Conflict

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Individuals often face tradeoffs:

  - personal gain  
  - group loyalty  

- 👉 Why don’t more people “defect” from group interests?

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/w1.png)

:::
::::

## Theory

- How do individuals navigate:

  - self-interest vs group interest?

- Linked fate (heuristic) is not enough  



- Instead, behavior depends on:

  - **social pressure**  
  - **internalized norms**  

- 👉 Group cohesion must be *enforced*, not just felt

## Experimental Design {.smaller}

All subjects (Black students at an HBCU):

- Given $100 to allocate between Obama and Romney  



- **Control**
  - no incentive, no pressure  

- **Incentive**
  - earn money for donating to Romney  
  - $\to$ incentive to defect  

- **Incentive + Newspaper**
  - same incentive  
  - but donation is public  

- 👉 Adds threat of social sanctions



*What do you expect?*

## Design and Expectations

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Key comparison:

  - private vs public decisions  

- 👉 Does visibility change behavior?

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/w2.png)

:::
::::

## Social Pressure Reduces Defection

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- With financial incentive:
  - many subjects defect  

- With public visibility:
  - defection drops sharply  

- 👉 Social pressure enforces group norms

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/w3.png)

:::
::::


## Internalized Norms Also Matter

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Some individuals resist incentives even when private  

- 👉 Norms can be internalized  

- But weaker than social pressure

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/w4.png)

:::
::::



## Linked Fate Does Not Predict Defection

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Linked fate does **not** reduce defection  

- 👉 Even strong group attachment does not prevent self-interested behavior  


:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/w5.png)

:::
::::

## Why Doesn’t Linked Fate Matter?

- If your fate is tied to the group:

  - why take the payout?


- Possible answers:

  - beliefs are not enough  
  - incentives still matter  
  - behavior depends on social context  

- 👉 Identity alone cannot explain cohesion

## Stronger Social Pressure → More Compliance

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Direct signals from in-group members  

- Increase perceived monitoring  

- 👉 Stronger pressure → less defection

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/w6.png)

:::
::::


## Key Conceptual Points {.smaller}

**Constraint model, not preference model**

- Individuals will defect when possible  

- Cohesion reflects:
  - costs of defection  
  - not pure loyalty  



- **Observability is central**

- Public behavior $\to$ enforced  
- Private behavior $\to$ less constrained  



- 👉 Political homogeneity is socially enforced

## Summary

- Individuals face real tradeoffs between self and group  

- Cohesion is maintained through:

  - social pressure  
  - internalized norms  

- Linked fate alone is insufficient  



- 👉 Group behavior depends on **social context and enforcement**

# {{<fa lightbulb>}} Racial Prejudice {.inverse}

## Measuring Racial Prejudice

- Take a few moments to write down:
  - aspects of racial prejudice
  - how we might measure them
  - how those measures may have changed over time

## Two Broad Approaches

- Scholars often distinguish between:

  - **Old-fashioned / overt racism**
  - **Modern / symbolic racism**

## Overt Racism

- Traditional measures of anti-Black prejudice among whites include:

  - desire for social distance
  - belief in biological inferiority
  - support for segregation

- These attitudes have generally declined over time

- But:

  - racial inequality persists
  - discrimination persists
  - opposition to remedial policies persists

## Trends in Overt Racism

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Overt racist attitudes have declined substantially

- But decline in explicit prejudice does **not** imply the end of racialized politics

- Key question:
  - what replaced it?

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/files/R-0321-EK-img3.png)

:::
::::

## Racism by Another Name

- Many scholars argue prejudice persists, but is expressed in less overt language:

  - **Modern Racism** (McConahay 1986)
  - **Symbolic Racism** (Kinder and Sears 1981)
  - **Racial Resentment** (Kinder and Sanders 1996)

## Racial Resentment: Conceptually

- Kinder and Sanders argue contemporary racial animus reflects a mix of:

  - anti-Black affect
  - beliefs about Black work ethic
  - denial of continued discrimination

## Racial Resentment: Measurement {.smaller}

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following?

- Over the past few years, black people have gotten less than they deserve.

- Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Black people should do the same without any special favors.

- It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if black people would only try harder they could be just as well off as white people.

- Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for black people to work their way out of the lower class.

## Racial Resentment and Trump Support

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Racial resentment strongly predicts support for Trump in 2016

- Interpreted by many as evidence that racial attitudes were central to contemporary partisan conflict

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/ic1.png)

:::
::::

## A Counterpoint: Aggregate Gains

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Grimmer, Marble, and Tanigawa-Lau (2022) shift attention from predicted probabilities to aggregate vote gains

- Their argument:
  - Trump’s net gains came disproportionately from the middle of the resentment scale

- This complicates simple “highest resentment $\to$ biggest electoral change” stories

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/g1.png)

:::
::::

## Aggregate Gains by Racial Resentment

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Different estimands can yield different interpretations

- Key lesson:
  - strong predictors are not always the same as large aggregate sources of electoral change

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/g2.png)

:::
::::

## A Central Critique

- Can racial resentment really distinguish:

  - racial prejudice
  - principled conservatism

- This is the central critique raised by Sniderman and colleagues

## Feldman and Huddy (2005)

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Feldman and Huddy ask:

  - does racial resentment measure prejudice?
  - or does it partly capture ideology?

- They test this directly with an experiment

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/fh1.png)

:::
::::

## Feldman and Huddy (2005): Design

- Experimental manipulation:
  - race and class of scholarship recipients

- Eight treatment conditions:

  - race only: White or Black
  - class only: poor or middle class
  - race and class combined:
    - poor White / poor Black
    - middle class White / middle class Black

## Feldman and Huddy (2005): Expectations

- If racial resentment reflects prejudice:

  - support should decline when beneficiaries are Black
  - resentment should matter more when race is salient

- If racial resentment reflects individualist ideology:

  - opposition should appear regardless of recipient race

## Evidence for Racial Prejudice

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Among some respondents, racial resentment predicts lower support specifically when programs benefit Black recipients

- This supports the prejudice interpretation

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/fh2.png)

:::
::::

## Class Complicates the Story

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Reactions depend not just on race, but also on class

- Racial resentment appears to work differently across combinations of deservingness and race

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/fh2a.png)

:::
::::

## Among Liberals

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- For liberals, racial resentment looks more like racial prejudice

- It predicts opposition to racially targeted benefits in a distinctly racialized way

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/fh4.png)

:::
::::

## Among Conservatives

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- For conservatives, racial resentment appears more entangled with ideology

- It may capture commitments to limited government and individualism as well as race

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/fh3.png)

:::
::::

## Summary

- Scholars debate whether racial resentment measures prejudice or ideology

- Feldman and Huddy (2005) provide evidence for both views

- Opposition to racially targeted programs:
  - reflects racial animus among liberals
  - is more entangled with ideology among conservatives

## Feldman and Huddy: Discussion {.smaller}

:::{.nonincremental}

*Discussion:*

- If racial resentment means something different for liberals and conservatives, what does that imply for how we should use it in research?

- How might these findings complicate how we interpret Tesler’s (2012) results about racial resentment and health care?

:::



# {{<fa lightbulb>}} Racialization of Policy Debates {.inverse}

## Post-Racial or Most Racial?

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Overt racism may have declined

- But:
  - racial resentment remains politically relevant
  - racial attitudes can shape ostensibly non-racial policy debates

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](https://images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com/images/I/41Gk5jCj9VL._SX331_BO1,204,203,200_.jpg)

:::
::::

## Tesler (2012)

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Core question:
  - Can a racialized political figure make a non-racial issue become racialized?

- Tesler’s answer:
  - yes

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/t1.png)

:::
::::

## Concept Check {.smaller}

- What does Tesler mean by:

  - **racialization**
  - **spillover of racialization**

- What kinds of data does he use?

- How does he distinguish race from partisanship?

## The Spillover of Racialization {.smaller}

- **Racialization**:
  - the process by which racial attitudes come to shape policy preferences

- **Spillover of racialization**:
  - racialized evaluations of a public figure spill over onto evaluations of that figure’s policies

- Example:
  - Obama $\to$ health care

## Data and Design

- Tesler uses both observational and experimental evidence

- **Observational**
  - compare the relationship between racial resentment and health care attitudes before and after Obama becomes associated with reform

- **Experimental**
  - vary the source cue:
    - Obama
    - Clinton
    - neutral / unnamed source

- Goal:
  - test whether the effect is about race rather than generic partisan polarization

## Observational Evidence

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Racial resentment becomes more predictive of health care attitudes in 2009

- Key claim:
  - the same issue becomes more racialized once Obama is strongly associated with it

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/t2.png)

:::
::::

## Panel Evidence

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Using panel data strengthens the argument

- Same respondents:
  - weaker racialization before Obama-centered reform debate
  - stronger racialization after

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/t3.png)

:::
::::

## Additional Evidence

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Multiple analyses point in the same direction

- Racial attitudes become more tightly linked to health care preferences once Obama becomes the face of reform

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/t4a.png)

:::
::::

## Additional Evidence

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- The pattern is not limited to one model or one dataset

- The central takeaway is the same:
  - Obama’s association with health care increases racialization

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/t4b.png)

:::
::::

## Additional Evidence

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Racialization is visible across several measures of attitudes and support

- This strengthens the spillover argument

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/t4c.png)

:::
::::

## Is It Race or Partisanship?

- Alternative explanation:
  - health care became more polarized because Democrats owned the issue

- Since the Democratic Party is seen as more racially liberal, the relationship could be spurious

- Tesler’s experiment is designed to address this

## Experimental Design {.smaller}

We would like to get your opinion about two current health care proposals being debated.

- As you may know, **[some people have / President Obama / President Clinton]** proposed a plan that would guarantee health insurance for all Americans. What do you think?

- **[Many of these same people have / President Obama / President Clinton]** also proposed a government-administered health insurance plan, often called the “public option,” to compete with private insurance. What do you think?

## Experimental Evidence

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Same policy
- Different source cue

- If Obama cue produces stronger racialization than Clinton cue:
  - that supports a race-specific mechanism

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/t5.png)

:::
::::

## Beyond Health Care

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Tesler also shows similar patterns for the stimulus

- This suggests the mechanism is broader than one single issue

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/t6.png)

:::
::::

## Black Support Under Obama

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Black support for health reform increases under Obama

- Result:
  - racial divisions widen from both sides

- This is not only about White opposition

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/t7.png)

:::
::::

## Summary

- Racial attitudes can spill over into ostensibly non-racial policy areas

- The same policy becomes more racialized depending on who proposes it

- Tesler’s core contribution:
  - elite identity can activate racial attitudes in public opinion

## How Race Shapes Politics: A Synthesis {.smaller}

:::{.nonincremental}

This week’s papers reveal two distinct mechanisms:

|  | **Tesler (2012)** | **White et al. (2014)** |
|---|---|---|
| **Level** | Public opinion | Political behavior |
| **Mechanism** | Elite cues *activate* racial attitudes | Group norms *constrain* individual choices |
| **Direction** | Top-down (elite $\to$ mass) | Horizontal (peer $\to$ peer) |
| **Key finding** | Same policy becomes racialized depending on who proposes it | Solidarity depends on social enforcement, not just identity |

- **Big idea:** Race operates through both *psychology* (how we think about issues) and *social structure* (how groups enforce norms).

:::



# {{<fa lightbulb>}} White Racial Identities {.inverse}

## White Racial Identities

- Until recently, relatively little research focused on the racial identities of Whites

## Why White Identity Was Overlooked {.smaller}

> Whiteness is everywhere in U.S. culture but it is very hard to see. ... As the unmarked category against which difference is constructed, whiteness never has to speak its name, never has to acknowledge its role as an organizing principle in social and cultural relations.  
> — Lipsitz (1998)

## Core Questions

- Do Whites identify as White?

- Are these identities politically relevant?

## Conventional Wisdom vs Current Understanding

- **Wong and Cho (2005)**
  - Do Whites identify as White? Yes
  - Is that identity politically relevant? Not much

- **Jardina (2019)**
  - Do Whites identify as White? Yes
  - Is that identity politically relevant? Yes

## Wong and Cho (2005)

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Early work shows that White group identification exists

- But its link to politics appears weaker than for minority identities

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/wc1.png)

:::
::::

## Measuring White Identity

> Please read over the list and tell me the number for those groups you feel particularly close to—people who are most like you in their ideas and interests and feelings about things.

## White Group Closeness

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Roughly half of Whites report feeling close to other Whites

- So:
  - White identity is not absent

- But this measure may be relatively weak and apolitical

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/wc2.png)

:::
::::

## Predictive Validity

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- White identification predicts:
  - in-group affect
  - stereotyping

- So the measure is not meaningless

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/wc3a.png)

:::
::::

## Predictive Validity

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- But its relationship to explicitly political outcomes remains less clear

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/wc3b.png)

:::
::::

## Link to Policy Preferences

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Wong and Cho find limited evidence that White identity strongly predicts policy views

- Their conclusion:
  - White identity exists, but is not obviously political

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/wc4.png)

:::
::::

## Summary of Early Work

- White identity exists

- These measures have some predictive validity

- But:
  - White identity does not initially appear strongly political
  - neither does Black identity when measured in similarly thin ways

## Jardina (2019)

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Jardina argues earlier work understated White identity because of:

  - measurement problems
  - limited theory
  - failure to consider changing context

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](https://images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com/images/I/41W2kGUG5%2BL._SX331_BO1,204,203,200_.jpg)

:::
::::

## Why White Identity May Be Different

- Whites are a dominant-status group

- This means White identity may be especially sensitive to perceived status threat

- Relevant contexts include:
  - Obama
  - immigration
  - demographic change

## White Identity vs White Consciousness

- **White identity**
  - importance
  - pride
  - commonality

- **White consciousness**
  - identity
  - perceived competition with out-groups
  - support for in-group cooperation

## Jardina’s Measures of White Identity {.smaller}

- **Importance**
  - How important is being White to your identity?

- **Pride**
  - To what extent do you feel that White people in this country have a lot to be proud of?

- **Commonality**
  - To what extent do you think White people share common interests and a common fate?

## White Racial Consciousness {.smaller}

Jardina defines racial consciousness for Whites as identification **plus**:

- **Competition**
  - How likely is it that many Whites are unable to find a job because employers are hiring minorities instead?

- **Cooperation**
  - How important is it that Whites work together to change laws that are unfair to Whites?

## High Levels of Identification

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Jardina finds substantial levels of White identification

- White racial identity is more widespread than older accounts suggested

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/aj1.png)

:::
::::

## High Levels of Consciousness

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- White consciousness is also present at meaningful levels

- Especially when identity is paired with competition and perceived threat

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/aj2.png)

:::
::::

## Predictive and Discriminant Validity

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- Jardina argues these measures are not reducible to:
  - partisanship
  - ideology
  - anti-Black affect

- They capture a distinct form of group politics

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/aj3.png)

:::
::::

## Who Identifies as White?

- White identity and consciousness tend to be higher among:

  - older respondents
  - lower education respondents
  - rural respondents
  - more authoritarian respondents

- They appear less related to:
  - region
  - economic dissatisfaction

## White Identity and American Identity

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- White identity is associated with American identity

- This raises an important conceptual question:
  - where does nationalism end and racial identity begin?

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/aj4.png)

:::
::::

## Perceived Discrimination Against Whites

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- White identity predicts perceptions that Whites face discrimination

- This is one pathway through which identity becomes politically consequential

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/aj5.png)

:::
::::

## White Identity and Immigration

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- White identity predicts opposition to immigration

- Especially when demographic change is framed as status threat

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/aj6.png)

:::
::::

## Support for White-Benefiting Policies

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- White identity predicts support for policies perceived to benefit Whites as a group

- This is evidence that White identity can structure policy preferences

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/aj7.png)

:::
::::

## Support for White-Benefiting Policies

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- White consciousness strengthens these associations further

- Identity becomes more political when paired with threat and group competition

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/aj8.png)

:::
::::

## White Identity and Trump Support

:::: {.columns}
::: {.column width="40%"}

- White identity also predicts support for Trump

- Suggests White identity is not merely symbolic:
  - it is electorally relevant

:::
::: {.column width="60%"}

![](images/10_race/aj9.png)

:::
::::

## Summary

- White racial identity exists and is politically salient

- Earlier work understated its relevance because of:
  - measurement
  - context
  - theory

- Open questions remain:
  - how distinct is White identity from national identity?
  - how distinct is it from racial prejudice?
  - what role do these identities play in recent elections?



# References

## References
